When the President says 'no', what happens next?
Today, there are matters related to our reserves that do not require the President to consult the Council of Presidential Advisers (CPA) - and consequently cannot be overridden by Parliament.
The CPA's primary function is to serve the President by providing access to an independent body of experienced advisers.
They play an additional role as a "check" on the President's exercise of his custodial powers.
TNP INFOGRAPHICS: BILLY KER
The Constitutional Commission argued that such matters could have significant systemic impact, and asked for the CPA to be consulted on all fiscal matters touching on Singapore's reserves and those related to key public service appointments.
The Commission also asked to add two new members - one appointed by the President and the other by the Prime Minister - to the six-member CPA.
In its White Paper, the Government accepted both suggestions, and set out guidelines in appointing members as well as make both new terms and reappointments last for six years.
Currently, CPA members are appointed for a term of six years but can be reappointed for successive terms of only four years.
On the Commission's suggestion on recalibrating the threshold for parliamentary override on issues the President and the CPA disagree on, the Government preferred to maintain status quo.
Under the current system, when the CPA disagrees with the President's decision to veto a Bill or a public service appointment, the decision can be voted on in Parliament. If at least two-thirds of Parliament votes against the President's veto, the Bill is passed or the appointment goes ahead.
Commission: Recalibrate threshold for parliamentary override to more closely reflect the degree of support the President has from the CPA. If the President vetoes and absolute majority of the CPA agrees, Parliament cannot override the veto.
If the President vetoes and a simple majority of the CPA disagrees, Parliament can override the veto with a simple majority.
The idea is that the stronger the support from the CPA, the harder it is for Parliament to override the decision.
Government: Retain current threshold and defer revisions for further review.
The calibrated approach may unintentionally emphasise or even politicise how individual members on the CPA, particularly its chairman, have voted instead of the collective judgment of the CPA as a whole.
While the bar for parliamentary override should not be set so low that it undermines the two-key safeguard, it is equally important that the override mechanism is able to effectively resolve potential gridlock, even as the complexion of the Parliament continues to change.